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ABSTRACT
Whilst most of the existing literature relating to advance decisions has focused on philo-
sophical questions, this article reﬂects on the signiﬁcant legal developments that have
occurred since the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The article provides a
critique of the controversial issues which have emerged within contemporary case law.
The focus of the discussion centres on capacity, the interpretation of the safeguards,
and the bias towards preservation of life.
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I . INTRODUCTION
Despite being recently placed on a statutory footing by section 24 of the Mental Cap-
acity Act 2005, medical advance decision making is not a new concept in English
law.1 It was recognised by Lord Goff in F v West Berkshire Health Authority2 that one
of the limits on necessity, the legal justiﬁcation for providing treatment without
consent in emergency situations, was the existence of some evidence of a pre-existing
wish of the patient, expressed at a time when she was competent, which indicated that
she may wish to refuse medical treatment for a particular illness or injury.3 Proceeding
to treat the patient in the face of this known objection would amount to tortious
battery, and could potentially lead to criminal prosecution.4 However, advance
© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press; all rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.
permissions@oup.com
1 See Re AK (Adult Patient) (Medical Treatment: Consent) [2001] 1 FLR 129; Re C (Adult: Refusal of Medical
Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290.
2 In Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) [1990] 2 AC 1.
3 Ibid at 75–6.
4 See B v NHS Hospital Trust [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam); [2002] 2 All ER 449; Collins v Wilcock [1984] 1
WLR 1172 at 1177.
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decisions at common law were subject to two strong caveats; the choice of the patient
had to be ‘clearly established’ and ‘applicable in the circumstances’. Fulﬁlling these
requirements, from a patient’s perspective, was easier said than done.
It was held by Munby J in HE v A Hospital NHS Trust that the burden of proof
rested on those who seek to establish the existence and continuing validity and applic-
ability of an advance decision and that, where life is at stake, the evidence must be
scrutinised with especial care.5 Thus, the patient faced an uphill struggle under the
common law to create and then prove a legally valid advance decision and these obsta-
cles served to constrain the legal protection that was afforded to a competent patient’s
decision about her future incompetent self.6 Indeed, as Michalowski has pointed out,
‘the new legislation as well as the common law apply a bias against the validity or
applicability of an advance refusal of life-saving treatment’.7 While this was certainly
true of the common law position, and is also true of the inherent framework of the
Mental Capacity Act 2005, the crucial question is whether or not this attitude con-
tinues to be evident in the judicial application of the legislation.8 Michalowski herself
acknowledges that ‘the impact of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 on the validity of
advance directives remains to be seen’,9 and so the recent case law that has materia-
lised since the inception of the Act provides fertile ground for exploring this import-
ant matter.
Within the framework of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, there remain a number of
contentious issues which have caused problems for judges when it comes to assessing
the validity and applicability of advance decisions. Questions concerning capacity, the
interpretation of the safeguards which were designed to allow an advance decision to
be legitimately overridden, and also the preservation of life, have all emerged as recur-
ring themes in the case law and serve to demonstrate the unsettled nature of the law
under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. While the majority of the existing literature sur-
rounding advance decisions focuses on philosophical and theoretical questions, this
article seeks to reﬂect on, and critically analyse, recent developments in the substan-
tive law since the introduction of the Mental Capacity Act 2005.10
The article begins by framing the debate and then moves the discussion beyond
the consideration of principally philosophical concerns and engages with a number of
important practical legal issues. The discussion then proceeds to explore the trajectory
of the law following the legislative intervention. Particular focus is placed on capacity,
the interpretation of the safeguards and the preservation of life, the problematic
nature of these themes being illustrated by reference to the evolving case law. The
5 HE v A Hospital NHS Trust [2003] EWHC 1017 (Fam) at [46].
6 There are other examples of cases under the common law in which advance decisions existed and were
overruled by the courts. SeeWHealthcare NHS Trust v H [2004] EWCACiv 1324; [2005] 1 WLR 834.
7 S Michalowski, ‘Advance Refusals of Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment: The Relativity of an Absolute
Right’ (2005) 68 Mod LR 958 at 960.
8 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 came into full force in England on 1 October 2007.
9 Michalowski, above n 7, at 968.
10 For other discussion, see AR Maclean, ‘Advance Directives and the Rocky Waters of Anticipatory Decision-
Making’ (2008) 16 Med LR 1. For comparative perspectives see M Navarro-Michel, ‘Advance Directives:
The Spanish Perspective’ (2005) 13 Med LR 137; TK Leng and SL Huey Sy, ‘Advance Medical Directives
in Singapore’ (1997) 5 Med LR 63. For a historical account see K Stern, ‘Advance Directives’ (1994) 2
Med LR 57.
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article ﬁnally concludes by assessing whether or not the continuing bias in favour of
preservation of life is as prevalent now as it once was under the common law.
I I . BACKGROUND: FRAMING THE DEBATE
Advance decisions are usually justiﬁed on the basis of autonomy. Dworkin argues that
respecting autonomy is important because it allows us to construct our own identity;
it ‘encourages and protects people’s general capacity to lead their own lives out of a
distinctive sense of their own character, a sense of what is important to and for
them’.11 His view of autonomy is thus based on a ‘narrative’ or ‘biographical’ view of
an individual human life: the person whom an individual develops into will depend
on the autonomous choices he or she makes now.12 If that individual then loses the
capacity to make further autonomous decisions, as that period of incapacity is as
much a part of their life as any other, then there is no reason why they cannot be
responsible for moulding that chapter of their life, provided they had the prescience
to do it while having capacity. This is referred to by Dworkin as ‘precedent auton-
omy’.13 On this interpretation, the future incompetent person is powerless to overturn
a previous decision because they no longer have the capacity for any fresh exercise of
autonomy.14 It is useful here to illustrate this by reference to the infamous ‘Margo
story’, which was discussed at length by Dworkin and subsequently analysed by Alas-
dair Maclean in his piece in the Medical Law Review.15 Margo is a 54-year-old woman
who is suffering from dementia. Despite her illness, she seems incredibly happy in her
existence, demonstrating signs of pleasure from reading the same books, painting the
same pictures, and from eating her favourite meal of banana and jam sandwiches.
However, Margo, in her previously competent state, drafted an advance decision to
refuse life-saving medical treatment should she ever be diagnosed with dementia.
Margo, in her now demented state, develops a chest infection which requires anti-
biotic treatment to save her life. Do her doctors override the advance decision or do
they respect it?
The difﬁculty in Margo’s scenario resides in the fact that whilst she has experiential
interests, she has no critical interests.16 She seems to have a happy life which provides
and satisﬁes her experiential interests and therefore the understandable temptation for
most doctors may be to ignore the advance decision and treat her. Dworkin, however,
argues that critical interests ought to be given priority over experiential ones and, as
the advance decision is the most convincing evidence of Margo’s critical interests, it
should be respected and the treatment withheld.17 His view of life as a narrative unity
places emphasis on identifying the ‘overall shape of the kind of life Margo wants to
11 R Dworkin, Life’s Dominion (Harper Collins 1993) at 224.
12 AR Maclean, ‘Advance Directives, Future Selves and Decision-Making’ (2006) 14 Med LR 291 at 294.
13 Dworkin, above n 11 at 226. See M Quante, ‘Precedent Autonomy and Personal Identity’ (1999) 9
Kennedy Inst Eth J 365 at 372.
14 Dworkin, above n 11 at 227.
15 Dworkin, above n 11 at 221, 226, and 228; Maclean, above n 12 at 295–9. See also AD Firlik, ‘Margo’s
Logo’ (1991) 265 JAMA 201.
16 Critical interests reﬂect a person’s autonomously determined goals and life plan; experiential interests
reﬂect the more immediate enjoyment from certain pleasing activities.
17 Dworkin, n 11 at 224–9.
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have led’, which is determined by the exercise of precedent autonomy through the use
of her advance decision.18
Dworkin’s view has come under attack from various scholars. Rebecca Dresser, for
example, argues that his view of life as a coherent narrative is ﬂawed. It does not take
into account the fact that unforeseen events can happen and circumstances can
change. Some people will simply live life taking each day as it comes and in ‘experien-
cing various life events, including setbacks in their physical and mental functioning,
may revise their goals, values, and deﬁnitions of personal well-being’.19 In short, a
person’s common life theme may simply be to accept and adjust to the changing cir-
cumstances that shape her life.20 Moreover, Dresser points to some more pragmatic
concerns about precedent autonomy, noting that future-oriented decision making is
an ‘incomplete form of self-determination’. Autonomous decision making prospers in
the context of on-going discussions between the patient, the healthcare professional,
and any other interested parties. New information can be absorbed into the decision-
making process and this cannot be achieved in advance decisions as they omit a
patient’s ‘participation at the crucial point when treatment decisions are activated’.21
Perhaps the strongest challenge to Dworkin’s work is grounded in the personal
identity problem. This problem centres on articulating the conditions under which
stages of a person’s life are stages of the same person or, alternatively, to explain the
circumstances which signal the development of a different person.22 Parﬁt’s view of
personal identity can be used to illustrate the frailties of Dworkin’s argument in
respect of the hypothetical Margo scenario. Parﬁt endorses a ‘Complex View’ of per-
sonal identity which consists of two relations: psychological connectedness and psy-
chological continuity.23 Psychological connectedness exists over time and to greater
or lesser degrees, depending on the extent to which a person continues to hold
various psychological features such as memories, intentions, beliefs, and desires. Psy-
chological continuity can exist even in the absence of direct psychological connection
between two points in time, as long as between those two points there are overlapping
chains of psychological connectedness.24 On this basis, personal identify can ﬂuctuate
over time, which, potentially, has ramiﬁcations for the validity of an advance decision.
Given that an advance decision is predicated on the notion that the individual it pur-
ports to bind in the future is in fact the same moral entity that created it, its authority
is undermined if that future individual is actually viewed as a different person. As
Dresser eloquently explains, ‘although in the Complex View it is quite conceivable
that the present and future selves will be strongly connected, so that the advance
18 Ibid at 226.
19 R Dresser, ‘Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Inﬁrmities and Hidden Values in the Law’
(1986) 28 Ariz L Rev 373 at 379.
20 R Dresser, ‘Dworkin on Dementia: Elegant Theory, Questionable Policy’ in H Kuhse and P Singer (eds),
Bioethics: An Anthology (Blackwell Publishers 1999) at 316.
21 R Dresser, ‘Advance Directives, Self Determination, and Personal Identity’ in C Hackler et al. (eds),
Advance Directives in Medicine (Praeger 1989) at 157.
22 Ibid at 158. See also J Perry, ‘The Problem of Personal Identity’ in J Perry (ed), Personal Identity Vol 3
(University of California Press 1975) at 15.
23 D Parﬁt, Reasons and Persons (Oxford University Press 1986) at 204–6.
24 Ibid at 205–6.
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decision raises little concern, it is also conceivable that no connection will exist
between the two selves’.25
Relating this back to the example of Margo, where a patient undergoes a signiﬁcant
change triggered by a condition like dementia, the degree of psychological continuity
needed to connect the former competent patient to her later incompetent self may be
lost. It is here where the advance decision is at is most vulnerable because, in effect,
Margo in her current demented state could be viewed as a ‘new’ person. If this is
believed, it is possible to suggest that the ‘old’ Margo no longer has the authority to
bind the ‘new’ Margo. Within this, there is of course room for disagreement in rela-
tion to the degree of continuity and connectivity that is necessary for the preservation
of personal identity, and this is a difﬁcult question to answer.26 Nonetheless, it is clear
to see that Parﬁt’s philosophy on personal identity represents a persuasive attack on
Dworkin’s view of precedent autonomy and the weight of advance decisions.
These theoretical debates are not easily resolved and there is no deﬁnitive answer
as to which view should prevail. This, in turn, makes it incredibly difﬁcult for the law
to deal with advance decisions. Clearly, it is tasked with ﬁnding some sort of ‘answer’
to the philosophical questions which continue to provoke disagreement. In its
attempt to achieve this, it seeks to balance out the tensions between the respect for
precedent autonomy on the one hand, and, on the other, the need to address a range
of other issues, such as the personal identity problem and the need for the law to
acknowledge and respect the rights and interests of those patients who lack capacity.27
Thus, a person has a legal right to draft an advance decision, but this may be overrid-
den by recourse to a number of safeguards which have been developed over time in
consideration of the range of problematic and uncertain factors identiﬁed above. The
question which then falls to be addressed is whether an apposite balance is struck or
whether the deck is weighted too heavily in favour of one side of the argument.
I I I . FROM PHILOSOPHY TO LAW: THE COMMON LAW
AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTION
Prior to legislative intervention, there was some authority to suggest that the common
law was not only prepared to acknowledge that an advance decision was an acceptable
legal instrument to give effect to autonomous choice, but also that it was prepared, in
certain circumstances, to enforce them. In Re AK, the health trust responsible for the
care of the patient sought a declaration that it would be lawful to comply with the
patient’s request to discontinue, two weeks from the date he lost the ability to com-
municate, the artiﬁcial ventilation, and the artiﬁcial nutrition and hydration (ANH),
that was keeping him alive. The patient suffered from motor neurone disease and had
communicated his prior wishes by blinking his eye, but he was aware that the move-
ment in that eye would shortly cease. Hughes J upheld the directive made by a patient
to stop artiﬁcial ventilation.28 In doing so, it was clear he had no doubt about the
25 Dresser, above, n 21 at 158.
26 See A Buchanan, ‘Advance Directives and the Personal Identity Problem’ (1988) 17 Phil & Pub Aff 277.
27 For an interesting discussion, see R Huxtable, Law, Ethics and Compromise at the Limits of Life: To Treat or
Not to Treat? (Routledge 2013). In particular, chs 1 and 3.
28 Re AK, above, n 1.
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patient’s capacity.29 A signiﬁcant factor in reaching this conclusion may have been the
irreversible and degenerative nature of the patient’s condition. Nonetheless, when an
advance decision was being used to refuse life-saving treatment where there was no
existing terminal, irreversible, or degenerative condition, preservation of life seemed
to be a key factor.
This attitude was epitomised in the aforementioned case of HE v A Hospital
Trust.30 Here, the patient was an adult Jehovah’s Witness who required a life-saving
blood transfusion; she had, however, previously written an advance decision speciﬁc-
ally refusing treatment of this kind in any circumstances. Her father sought a declar-
ation that it would be lawful for the hospital to administer the transfusion
notwithstanding the advance decision. Munby J granted the declaration.31
Munby J’s analysis of the law relating to advance decisions in the case serves to
illustrate some of the difﬁculties faced by individuals attempting to assert the legal val-
idity of an advance decision. As noted, he held that the legal burden of proof was on
the person seeking to establish the validity and applicability of an advance decision
and that, where the decision concerned the refusal of life-saving treatment, the evi-
dence must be subject to especially careful scrutiny.32 He also stated that, if there was
any doubt, it had to be resolved in favour of preservation of life.33 Thus, the person
seeking to enforce the advance decision must prove, on the balance of probabilities,
that it is valid and applicable. That in itself will not always be easy to achieve, espe-
cially given that in most cases those seeking to overturn the advance decision will be
able to adduce evidence of at least some doubt.
For those wishing to use an advance decision to refuse life-saving treatment, it
appeared under the common law that they would be held to a higher standard of
proof when seeking to establish validity and applicability. The advance decision must
have been supported by ‘convincing’ and ‘inherently reliable’ evidence and that evi-
dence would be subject to a higher degree of scrutiny from a judge.34 As a result,
Michalowski accurately identiﬁed that ‘to scrutinise evidence with special care seem
[ed] to amount to scrutinising evidence supporting the continuing validity and applic-
ability of an advance decision with special care, without applying a similar standard of
scrutiny to the evidence against its validity’.35 A modicum of doubt raised against val-
idity could therefore trigger the bias in favour of the preservation of life and the subse-
quent overriding of an advance decision, while the individual trying to prove validity,
someone who was often not the patient, was left having to second-guess what
amounted to ‘convincing’ and ‘inherently reliable’ evidence. Munby J did very little to
expound the meaning of these two terms, so those seeking to assert validity faced a
degree of uncertainty as to precisely what would sufﬁce to discharge the evidential
burden.
29 Ibid at 133 and 136.
30 See above, n 5.
31 See above, n 5 at [52].
32 See above, n 5 at [46].
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Michalowski, above, n 7 at 971.
6 • MEDICAL LAW REVIEW








In HE, the patient had executed a detailed advance decision in writing which was
signed and witnessed.36 Her advance decision was, admittedly, based on her previous
religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness and there was evidence that she had recently
renounced her faith by becoming engaged to a Muslim. Thus, on one view, Munby J
may have been justiﬁed in concluding that, as her prior wishes were based entirely on
her beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness, her advance decision may have lost its credibility at
the point she rejected the faith.37 However, there was still strong evidence suggesting
that her advance decision remained her ﬁxed decision. It was created only two years
prior to the incident, it was extensive, and the patient had made no attempt to with-
draw it. What more could the patient have done? Equally, what further evidence could
her representatives have introduced to prove that the advance decision represented
her true wishes? This underscores the problem, as those seeking to override a deci-
sion, in this case the patient’s father, simply had to introduce an element of doubt
into a judge’s mind, this seemingly being enough to negate even the most watertight
of written advance decisions.38
It could be argued, then, that after Munby J’s judgment in HE, the common law
was operating from the wrong position. Once a patient has executed an advance deci-
sion in writing, why should the legal burden rest on the patient to prove its validity
and applicability? This is akin to saying that the presumption is that any advance deci-
sion is invalid unless proved otherwise. Is it not credible to suggest that the law
should work from the opposite starting point in that once the existence of advance
decision is, in principle, established, then the legal burden should rest on those
seeking to question it by requiring them to disprove, on the balance of probabilities,
its continuing validity and applicability? The criticism of this opposite approach may
be that the considerable amount of legal and evidential uncertainty surrounding
advance decisions under the common law warranted this cautious attitude and that to
hold otherwise would cause damage to the presumption in favour of life, which would
constitute an undesirable legal position. Nevertheless, it may certainly go some way
towards redressing what was an uneven balance between respecting the patient’s prior
wishes and the preservation of life. Even if this is rejected, certainly there is a more
convincing argument that imposing the burden on the patient or their representative,
coupled with the requirement of a higher standard of proof, placed them at too great a
disadvantage. In this context, there should not be a more demanding standard of
proof required from one side than the other. This position can be adequately
redressed by simply saying that the evidence on both sides has to be scrutinised with
special care to ascertain where the balance should tip in a given case. To expect some-
thing more from the party who is already at a disadvantage is to place an almost insur-
mountable obstacle in their way. This did not seem to be recognised by Munby J,
indeed the very clear message from him was that the bias in favour of life was a central
feature of the common law position.
Sections 24 and 25 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 introduced statutory advance
decisions. Section 24 (1) states that an: ‘“Advance decision” means a decision made
36 See above, n 5 at [4].
37 See above, n 5 at [49].
38 See above, n 5 at [50].
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by a person, after he has reached 18 and when he has capacity to do so, that if (a) at a
later time and in such circumstances as he may specify, a speciﬁed treatment is pro-
posed to be carried out or continued by a person providing health care for him, and
(b) at that time he lacks capacity to consent to the carrying out or continuation of the
treatment, the speciﬁed treatment is not to be carried out or continued’.39 The
advance decision can be expressed in layman’s terms,40 can be withdrawn or altered at
any time when the patient has capacity to do so,41 and any withdrawal or alteration
does not need to be in writing (unless the decision is altered to concern refusal of life
saving treatment).42 The counterbalance is found under section 25, which provides a
range of safeguards that allow any advance decision to be overridden where it is
deemed invalid or inapplicable. Hence, a decision is not valid if it has been withdrawn
at a time when the patient has capacity to do so,43 or if the patient has done anything
inconsistent with the advance decision remaining his ﬁxed decision.44 Similarly, the
advance decision is not applicable to treatment where the patient has the capacity to
give or refuse consent.45 Under the legislation, the grounds for declaring a decision
inapplicable to the treatment in question are far-reaching and include situations in
which the treatment is not the treatment speciﬁed in the advance decision,46 where
any circumstances speciﬁed in the advance decision are absent or where there are rea-
sonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist which the patient did not
anticipate at the time of making the advance decision.47 Further to this, there are add-
itional formalities which must be complied with if the advance decision concerns
refusal of life-saving treatment: the patient must make this decision in writing and it
needs to be witnessed and counter-signed by that witness.48
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 therefore aims to clarify the law in respect of
advance decisions. It strives to obtain the optimum balance between precedent auton-
omy and the preservation of life by deﬁning clearly the requirements for executing an
advance decision and by specifying explicitly the circumstances in which an advance
decision may be deemed inapplicable and invalid. Given that the refusal of life-saving
treatment via an advance decision under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 now requires
the patient to comply with additional formalities, one may be forgiven for thinking
that, once these have been completed, an advance decision may be less prone to legal
dispute and therefore more difﬁcult to overturn. If this is the case, does the legislation
go some way towards remedying the bias in favour of preservation life that pervaded
the previous common law position?49 There has not been a signiﬁcant amount of
case law to date, but the early signs are mixed.
39 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 24 (1) (a) and (b).
40 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 24 (2).
41 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 24 (3).
42 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 24 (4) and (5).
43 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (2) (a).
44 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (2) (c).
45 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (3).
46 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (4) (a).
47 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (4) (b) and (c).
48 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (5), (6) (a)–(d).
49 For an interesting critical reﬂection of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, see C Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing
Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Hart Publishing 2009), ch 8.
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IV. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MENTAL
CAPACITY ACT 2005
A. Capacity
The entire premise of an advance decision is that it is made at a time when a patient is
competent, and is intended to apply at a future date when that competency is lost.
Thus, the issue of capacity is central to validity.50 However, the difﬁculty for judges is
that, even though capacity is presumed, they have to assess it retrospectively. Given
that there could be a considerable time lapse between the creation of an advance deci-
sion and that point at which its validity and applicability comes to be tested, judges
under the common law demonstrated a tendency, perhaps understandably, to
approach the assessment of capacity cautiously.
This attitude was illuminated in The NHS Trust v T.51 The case itself was heard
under the common law. Nonetheless, it is necessary to discuss it here in order to
provide the context and to set the scene for the problems which continue to exist in
respect of capacity under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The patient suffered from a
borderline personality disorder and had a long history of psychiatric treatment. She
had, on a number of occasions, self-harmed by cutting herself and blood-letting. The
consequence of this was that her haemoglobin would fall dangerously low so that she
would require an emergency blood transfusion. However, in 2004, she created a
written and signed advance decision in which she set out her wishes to refuse any
blood transfusion on the basis that she was caught in a set of circumstances which
were impossible to endure and that her blood was evil and carried evil around her
body.52 A letter accompanied the advance decision from her GP in which it was con-
ﬁrmed that the patient understood the nature and consequence of her advance deci-
sion and that it may result in her death.53
Charles J held that the patient lacked capacity at the time she made the advance
decision and therefore it could be overridden.54 This decision was reached despite evi-
dence from two consultants in 2001 (in which a similar incident occurred), and from
her GP in 2004, which indicated that the patient retained capacity.55 Charles J, never-
theless, preferred the evidence of one consultant who reached the opposite conclu-
sion.56 Admittedly, in terms of the specialist consultants, this evidence was the most
recent.57 However, by Charles J’s own admission, the situation in 2004 was virtually
identical to that in 2001, and the patient’s condition had not signiﬁcantly changed in
the interim.58
50 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 24 (1) (a)–(b).
51 [2004] EWHC 1279.
52 Ibid at [8].
53 Ibid at [9].
54 Ibid at [62].
55 Ibid at [55], [56], and [59].
56 One other consultant seemed to be in agreement, albeit less forcefully, that Ms T ‘temporarily lacked cap-
acity’, ibid at [57].
57 Ibid at [10] and [16].
58 This was stated by Charles J, ibid at [58], and also conﬁrmed by the consultant who held that Ms T lacked
capacity in 2004, ibid at [10].
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This strikes at the very heart of the problem created by Munby J’s approach in
HE.59 Taking the presumption of capacity as the starting point, and adding to that the
GP’s supporting letter, there was more evidence in favour of the patient in T having
capacity at the time she made her advance decision than not. Thus, given that the pre-
sumption of capacity favours the patient, it seems plausible to suggest that those
seeking to disprove capacity must be able to present sufﬁcient evidence in order to
rebut that presumption on the balance of probabilities.60 This was not apparent from
the reasoning in T. There was some evidence that contradicted the patient having cap-
acity, but it was minimal and arguably not as convincing. Certainly, there were
grounds to suggest a varying standard of evidential scrutiny, but possibly in the wrong
direction. Charles J examined carefully the evidence of one consultant who assessed
and conﬁrmed Ms T’s competency in reference to the legal test for capacity.61 He
disagreed with this consultant’s application of the legal test, but he had a questionable
basis for doing so which seemed to be heavily inﬂuenced by the evidence he preferred
in respect of Ms T’s mental illness and misconception of reality.62 If he had applied
the same standard of evidential scrutiny to the consultant who concluded Ms T
lacked capacity as he did to those who conﬁrmed she retained it, he would have had
to concede that nowhere in that evidence was there any reference to the assessment
being made in reference to the legal test for capacity. It is quite right that a mental dis-
order may impinge on a patient’s ability to make a decision, but this is not automatic-
ally the case. The legal test for ascertaining capacity is based on a functional approach
and so emphasis is placed on the ability to make a decision having regard to the
patient’s aptitude to understand information, retain it, use, or weigh it in the decision-
making process and appreciate the consequences of their choice.63 There was evi-
dence that the patient’s personality disorder had not affected her to the extent that
she could not satisfy these requirements at the time she made her advance decision
and on one view this evidence was ‘convincing’ and ‘inherently reliable’.64 The
patient’s perception of her blood being evil was unusual, bordering on irrational, but
that a decision itself seems strange does not necessarily mean the ability to make that
decision is impaired. This unduly cautious approach to the question of capacity may
well be underpinned by a misunderstanding of mental illness. Judges, and indeed
some expert witnesses, may confuse the (perceived) rationality of a decision with
the capacity to understand the nature and consequences of a decision. The reality of
the situation may well be that there is a view among judges that the very nature of the
underlying mental illness from which a patient is suffering makes it impossible to
meet the functional requirement of using and weighing the relevant information to
make a decision. If this is the prevailing attitude, it could potentially cause a much
59 See above, n 5.
60 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 2 (4).
61 See above n 51 at [56]. The consultant in question referred to the common law test for capacity in Re C
(Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1994] 1 WLR 290. The test is now found in the Mental Capacity
Act 2005, see below, n 63.
62 See above, n 51 at [63].
63 See Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3 (1) (a)–(d). For discussion see M Gunn and others, ‘Decision Making
Capacity’ (1999) 7 Med LR 269; M Gunn, ‘The Meaning of Incapacity’ (1994) 2 Med LR 8.
64 See above, n 51 at [56].
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bigger challenge to the validity of advance decisions made by patients who are deemed
incompetent simply by virtue of the particular illness from which they are suffering.
With this in mind, judges ought not to allow this mind-set to dominate. Negating the
functional aspect of the capacity test may be the effect of some mental illness, but not
all. Notwithstanding the particular illness that the patient is suffering from, or the
irrationality or otherwise of the decision, if there is clear evidence to support the fact
that the patient still satisﬁes the functionality aspect of the capacity test, and indeed the
other components, then there ought to be no reason why judges should remain unwill-
ing to accept certain decisions made by certain patients. If all cases are approached in a
similar way to T, a credible challenge could always be mounted in relation to the ques-
tion of capacity, thereby providing the basis for overriding the majority of advance deci-
sions which are designed to refuse life-saving treatment.
One further weakness of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 in respect of advance deci-
sion making is epitomised in the recent case of A Local Health Authority v E.65 This
case arose after the introduction of the legislation and so fell squarely within its remit.
The patient was a 32-year-old woman who suffered extremely severe anorexia
nervosa. E’s death was imminent, yet she was refusing to eat and taking only a small
amount of water.66 This situation was compounded by the fact that E had twice
attempted to make an advance decision to refuse treatment. After initially being
deemed competent and drafting her ﬁrst advance decision, the patient was formally
detained under the terms of section 3 of the Mental Health Acts of 1983 and 2007.
There was some confusion about whether in fact she lacked capacity at this time,
although it was later conﬁrmed by Jackson J that E did lack capacity to make the ﬁrst
advance decision.67 She later demonstrated behaviour that indicated that she may
have regained capacity, if indeed she had ever lost it in the ﬁrst place.68 E then drafted
a second formal advance decision, signed and witnessed by her mother and a health-
care professional. This was to the effect that if she was close to death she did not want
tube feeding or life support, but would accept pain relief and palliative care.69 Despite
the formalities being complied with, and the ﬁnding that E had not withdrawn her
advance decision, Jackson J held that she did not have the requisite capacity at the
time she made the advance decision. His view ran contrary to the general consensus
of medical opinion surrounding E’s condition and he reached this conclusion despite
E having taken advice from her solicitor and independent mental health advocate.70
Jackson J’s primary reason for reaching this view was that there was no formal assess-
ment of E’s capacity at the time she created the advance decision.71 There was
evidence of doubt as to whether, had it taken place, the ﬁndings of any such investiga-
tion would have yielded a conclusion in favour of capacity. This was enough to tip the
balance in favour of preservation of life.72
65 [2012] EWHC 1639.
66 Ibid at [1].
67 Ibid at [59].
68 Ibid at [60]. She was either pulling at her peg line or reluctantly agreeing to it being left in.
69 Ibid at [61].
70 Ibid at [64].
71 Ibid at [65].
72 Ibid at [65].
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Amid the range of formalities that were included in the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
what mechanisms are in place within the legislation to ensure that a patient is compe-
tent at the time they actually draft their advance decision? The answer is, quite simply,
none. A case can be made that the legislation should have included more robust
requirements in terms of the assessment of capacity at this crucial point. Where a
patient wishes to use an advance decision to end her life, the additional formalities
demand that there is a witness who is signatory to it.73 Nonetheless, there is nothing
to say that the witness must perform a formal assessment of a patient’s capacity before
they act as a signatory and this may have been worthy of inclusion.
The law, quite rightly, has to be hesitant in placing too many obstacles in front of
patients when it comes to advance decision making. A central pillar of the recognition
and enforcement of statutory advance decision making is that while the law seeks to
provide a greater degree of certainty and clariﬁcation, it must also aim to ensure
advance decision making is as accessible as possible to all patients.74 The question of
balance comes into play here. The legislation as it currently stands attempts to reach a
fair compromise by not requiring a formal assessment of capacity at the time an
advance decision is made; the law is therefore open to all patients to utilise who have
a prima facie right to create an advance decision on the basis that their capacity is pre-
sumed, with the counterbalance being that this can be overridden by a judge if there
is genuine doubt as to that capacity at the time of drafting. The ﬂexibility offered by
this approach is useful in certain situations. Absent any formal assessment of capacity
by a witness at the time a patient executes an advance decision, in cases where a
patient has a history of mental illness, as was the situation in E, or where a patient has
previously demonstrated suicidal tendencies, the question of capacity will not always
be clear cut and so allowing judges room to manoeuvre and to override the presump-
tion of capacity when a patient’s inability to make a decision is called into question
may not always be inappropriate. However, any doubt raised must be capable of satis-
fying the balance of probabilities standard and, in view of the evidence, it was not
readily apparent that this threshold was met in cases such as T and E.75 Problems are
thus encountered if the law allows a judge to override the presumption in favour of
capacity too easily, based on an ill-deﬁned measure of doubt. If this happens, the law
undoes a lot of the work it has done in seeking to ensure accessibility. What it gives
on the one hand, it takes away on the other, if, without great effort, a judge can simply
rule that the patient lacked capacity at the time of writing the directive.
The law may have also resisted requiring a formal assessment of capacity for a
number of other reasons. First, it would be in direct conﬂict with the golden thread
that runs through the Mental Capacity Act 2005, the presumption of capacity.76
Requiring an assessment of a patient’s capacity by a witness as a prerequisite to valid-
ating the advance decision reverses this and works from the starting position that
patients are incapable of exercising their right of choice before someone else conﬁrms
they are capable of doing so. This would severely undermine the notion of autonomy
73 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (6) (d).
74 For an interesting discussion see Huxtable, above n 27.
75 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 2 (4).
76 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 1 (2).
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by placing a barrier in the way of patient choice. Nevertheless, capacity is issue-
speciﬁc, and requiring a formal assessment of capacity only in relation to validating an
advance decision would not cause harm to the general proposition that a patient is
still presumed to be able to make autonomous choices about other aspects of their
life.77 Second, there is the further consideration that, in many cases, the witness will
not be a trained professional with the ability to assess capacity. Often the person
witnessing the creation of an advance decision will be a family member or friend, or a
professional person such as a solicitor or doctor. Not all doctors are trained in asses-
sing capacity, and the majority of solicitors will not be able to perform this task.78
Thus, it would certainly add a further and perhaps unwelcome layer of complexity
to insist that the witness must be a trained professional with expertise in assessing
capacity. It stands to reason that this would inhibit access by making the process of
creating an advance decision more costly, time-consuming, and bureaucratic. Yet, as
the law stands, we are still left with a situation in which the central feature of the
advance decision, the feature which gives it teeth, is left untested and this will always
render it vulnerable to attack.
With this in mind, there is perhaps a different approach to consider. A balance
does need to be struck between accessibility and retaining an appropriate scope to
override an advance decision when it is deemed necessary based on the circumstances
of the patient. However, many patients still do not use the law to create advance deci-
sions, regardless of its attempt to make them as accessible as possible. Thus, for those
patients who do take the time and make the effort to create an advance decision, they
would be unlikely to object to the additional requirement of an assessment of capacity
at the time it is made; this is because, having taken the conscious decision to make an
advance decision in the ﬁrst place, the aim of most patients will be to make it as difﬁ-
cult as possible to overturn. Those patients who cannot, for capacity-related reasons,
make that decision will be prevented from doing so at this early stage. This would
remove some of the doubt that currently exists surrounding the question of capacity
and would give further credence to the argument that the validity of an advance deci-
sion should be presumed and that the legal burden should fall on those seeking to
negate it to prove that it is not valid or applicable.
Two further points are worthy of mention here. First, a formal assessment of cap-
acity at the time of the creation of an advance decision would not be absolute conclu-
sive evidence of capacity. That is to say it would not mean that a formal assessment
and ﬁnding of capacity at the time an advance decision was made could never be dis-
proved from that point onwards. The underpinning rationale would simply be to
ensure that the court was obliged to place great weight on that formal assessment at
the time of creation. However, judges would still not be bound by the assessment
carried out by experts and so a ﬁnding of capacity at that time could still be overridden
in certain exceptional situations. Thus, an advance decision would still be prone to
attack if, for instance, judges continue to adhere to the view that certain underlying ill-
nesses negate the ability to satisfy the functional requirement of the capacity test
77 See JK Mason and GT Laurie,Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (9th edn OUP 2013) at 85.
78 See K Evans, J Warner, and E Jackson, ‘How Much Do Emergency Healthcare Workers Know About Cap-
acity and Consent?’ (2007) 24 Emerg Med J 391.
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simply by virtue of the presence of the illness itself. If judges remain aligned to this
reasoning, and it is submitted that they should not, it would have to be proved that
the particular condition in question was absent at the time the advance decision was
constructed in order for the formal assessment of capacity to have any signiﬁcant
impact.
To this end, would anything have changed in cases such as E and T had a formal
assessment taken place? Certainly, in E there was evidence that Jackson J was con-
cerned about the lack of a formal assessment of capacity at the time the patient
created the advance decision and so had this been present and supportive of compe-
tency he may have been more inclined to ﬁnd in favour of the patient. Likewise, in T,
had a formal assessment been carried out supporting a ﬁnding of capacity at the time
the advance decision was composed, and had this assessment been undertaken by a
trained expert in the ﬁeld rather than a GP, it may well have focused Charles J’s mind
on the precise amount and type of evidence that was actually needed to disprove the
ﬁnding of capacity. He still would have been at liberty to override the view of the
expert, but perhaps he would have been more cautious in doing so, especially in view
of the fact that he would have had to consider whether he could, justiﬁably, point to
enough evidence to support the conclusion that the patient did in fact lack capacity
on the balance of probabilities. This, in turn, raises a question about the standard of
proof that would be required to override a formal ﬁnding of capacity at the time an
advance decision was executed. Once a formal assessment of capacity is made in
favour of the patient, it could be argued that it would no longer be sufﬁcient to allow
it to be disproved merely by reference to the balance of probabilities. In view of the
tightening of the capacity assessment at the time of creation, it may be more appropri-
ate for the law to consider requiring a higher degree of proof to disprove that initial
ﬁnding of capacity at a later date. For example, in the speciﬁc context of advance deci-
sion making, in order to disprove a formal ﬁnding of capacity, one suggestion may be
that it would be suitable to impose the requirement of proof beyond reasonable
doubt that the patient actually lacked capacity at the time the advance decision was
prepared. On the other hand, introducing this higher standard of proof outside the
sphere of the criminal law may be thought to be undesirable as it would overly restrict
judges in some delicately poised cases. Accordingly a more appropriate requirement
may be to demand ‘substantial and convincing’ evidence in order to support the over-
riding of a formal ﬁnding of capacity. While the idea of having to disprove any formal
assessment and ﬁnding of capacity beyond the standard of the balance of probabilities
may not sit easily with some, any move to implement this would apply only to
advance decisions and the remainder of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 would remain
unaffected. The clear beneﬁt, however, would be a greater degree of legal protection
for the wishes of patients who can demonstrate clear competence at the time of creat-
ing an advance decision.
The second issue, which ﬂows neatly from the above, is that care would have to be
taken to ensure that the assessment did not become a mere rubber stamping exercise
and measures would need to be considered to prevent patients from ‘shopping
around’ to ﬁnd an expert who will deem them competent. Yet, in principle, this
approach may go some way towards a situation in which advance decisions are pre-
vented from being relied upon in cases where they should not be, and respected and
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enforced when they should. At the very least, this would remove some of the confu-
sion and uncertainty that continues to plague not only judges, but also healthcare pro-
fessionals who are tasked with having to determine the validity and applicability of an
advance decision in clinical settings, where time is often of the essence.
Not infrequently, Codes of Practice are used to put ﬂesh on the bones of the sub-
stantive law. However, the Mental Capacity 2005 Code of Practice does not provide
any useful guidance in relation to the question of assessing capacity at the time the
advance decision was created. It simply says that, if healthcare professionals are not satis-
ﬁed that the person had capacity at the time they created the advance decision, they
are entitled to treat that patient and will incur no liability for doing so.79 The inter-
pretation of ‘not satisﬁed’ is therefore critical. The Code of Practice indicates that, if
doctors are aware of reasonable grounds to doubt that the person had capacity at the
time they made the advance decision, then this is enough to treat the patient without
fear of liability. This sends a somewhat contradictory message to doctors by espousing
blurred standards. The standard of ‘not satisﬁed’ invokes subjective connotations.
Thus, is a doctor entitled to treat purely on the basis of a subjective belief that the
patient did not have capacity at the time they created an advance decision? If so, this
is a low evidential standard to satisfy which, on one view, makes it too easy to ignore
an advance decision. If, however, doctors have to substantiate ‘not being satisﬁed’ by
pointing to some ‘reasonable grounds’ for doubt, this raises the evidential bar slightly
as it implies a degree of objectivity is required for meeting that threshold. The
problem still remains, though, as to what constitutes ‘reasonable grounds’ for doubt?
The inference is that it needs to be something more than just introducing an element
of doubt, but, with the issue of capacity being fraught with so much uncertainty,
simply being able to point to something may still be enough to inﬂuence a doctor or a
judge to override an advance decision.
The imposition of a formal assessment of capacity as a precursor to validating an
advance decision is, in many respects, a sensible option. It would reduce accessibility,
but, given the importance of advance decisions to refuse life-saving treatment, it
would also represent a further appropriate safeguard, helping to achieve the necessary
overall balance which the law must strike in this context. At present, the law’s open-
ended approach to the question of capacity could serve to hinder a competent
patient’s wish to utilise an advance decision.
B. Interpretation of the safeguards
One of the main aims of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 was to introduce appropriate
safeguards which would clarify the situations in which advance decisions are binding
and, more importantly, where they can be legitimately overridden.80 Thus, the law has
attempted to reach a compromise.81 It strives to afford appropriate protection to the
competent patient’s right to self-determination, but at the same time recognises that
79 See the Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (Department for Constitutional Affairs, London
2007) at [9.8].
80 See Explanatory Notes to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, paras [84]–[92].
81 For an interesting discussion on compromise, see Huxtable, above, n 27. In particular, see chs 6–8.
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the future incompetent patient is still a person whose rights and interests need to be
considered and, in some cases, observed.
One drafting criticism is that the safeguards are opaque, imprecise, and open-
ended, almost to the point where it could be said that there will be legitimate grounds
to overturn an advance decision in the majority of circumstances. As such, the ques-
tion of interpretation becomes pivotal.
In X Primary Care Trust v XB and YB,82 the patient suffered from motor neurone
disease and drafted an advance decision to instruct the doctors to discontinue his life-
sustaining ventilation in the event that he should deteriorate and lose the ability to
communicate. He drafted the advance decision by blinking his eyes at a communica-
tion board and this was prepared in the presence of his wife, his General Practitioner,
and a mental capacity co-ordinator.83 The application concerning the validity and
applicability of the advance decision was actually brought by the Trust due to con-
cerns they had about the circumstances in which the advance decision was signed.
These concerns were made known to the Trust by one of the patient’s carers, but
were found by Theis J to lack substance.84 However, the speciﬁcity of the advance
decision was also called into question. An advance decision is not applicable to the
treatment in question if that treatment is not the treatment speciﬁed in the advance
decision.85 Thus, while the legislation recognises that patients cannot be expected to
be familiar with technical medical terminology,86 there is still some debate about the
amount of precision needed to draft a valid advance decision.87
In XB, the patient drafted his advance decision to refuse ‘non-invasive’ ventilation
when in actual fact what he had received since 2003 was ‘invasive’ ventilation. Equally,
there was confusion about a ‘valid until’ date section on the advance decision pro
forma, which had the date of 2nd May 2012, the day after the court hearing, written
next to it. This caused Theis J to openly admit that the terms of the advance decision
were ‘not always clear’. Notwithstanding this, he upheld its validity.88 This is curious,
particularly when viewed against that backdrop of his concluding remarks that there
should be ‘clarity in relation to what the terms of the advance decision are’.89
The approach of Theis J seems to contradict that articulated by Munby J in HE
under the common law. His starting point appeared to be that there was an advance
decision in place, which raised a prima facie presumption that it should be respected.
For him, then, the advance decision represented reliable evidence of the patient’s
intention and actual wishes, and, on the evidence, it was more likely than not that any
doubt as to applicability and validity did not undermine the patient’s true intent.90 It
therefore seems that the evidence questioning the validity and applicability of the
82 [2012] EWHC 1390 (Fam).
83 Ibid at [16].
84 Ibid at [23].
85 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (4) (a).
86 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 24 (2) provides that drafting an advance decision in layman’s terms does not,
in itself, invalidate it.
87 See M Brazier and E Cave,Medicine, Patients and the Law (5th edn, Penguin 2011) at 162.
88 See above n 82 at [20].
89 Ibid at [35].
90 Ibid at [20].
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advance decision was afforded greater scrutiny and, on the facts, it was not convincing
enough to override it. This approach is welcomed and certainly indicates that some
judges at least will not be quick to invoke the safeguards unless there is compelling
evidence to support their applicability. In XB, however, there was clear and sufﬁcient
evidence for the Judge to deduce that the patient had the necessary capacity to make
the decision.91
The obiter comments of Jackson J in the previously mentioned case of A Local
Health Authority v E are also of relevance.92 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides
that an advance decision is not valid if the maker has done anything inconsistent with
it remaining their ﬁxed decision.93 First, the judge acknowledged that some patients
will try to close off this particular avenue by including in the wording of their advance
decision a clause to the effect that ‘if behaviour is exhibited seemingly contrary to the
advance decision this should not be viewed as a change of decision’.94 He conﬁrmed
that this would not be effective to override section 25 (2) (c) of the MCA. Moreover,
he indicated how he would have approached the question of inconsistent behaviour
had it been a relevant consideration, which on the facts it was not, as a result of his
conclusion that the patient lacked capacity.95 Jackson J identiﬁed that there were
factors suggestive of inconsistent behaviour from the patient. For example, in psycho-
therapy sessions, the patient had said she had made up her mind to live; she spoke
eloquently of a desire to have a life and conveyed that she wanted to study midwifery
and eventually wanted to have children.96 Despite this, Jackson J stated that in con-
tinuing to refuse food, E’s behaviour was ‘entirely consistent’ with her advance deci-
sion and that he would have been ‘reluctant to conclude’ that the advance decision
was undermined by the evidence supporting inconsistency.97 If, therefore, the issue of
capacity had been decided in favour of the patient, there was still evidence to indicate
some uncertainty about her advance decision remaining her ﬁxed decision. Yet, the
inference is that this would not have been sufﬁcient to outweigh evidence pertaining
to the patient’s continued refusal of food. While it was never a live issue, in respect of
this particular safeguard Jackson J seemed more convinced by the idea that the
actions of the patient spoke louder than the words. His approach echoes that of Theis
J in X,98 in that, once the question of capacity is decided in favour of the patient, if
there is still evidence to contradict an advance decision by reference to one of the
safeguards, it ought to be examined carefully in order to ensure that its strength and
veracity can be compared against the evidence weighing in favour of enforcement. It is
too early to say with any certainty, but this does not imply that a minimal standard of
evidence will sufﬁce in future cases to trigger the application of the safeguards, which
could be construed as revealing the possibility of a subtle change in direction from the
courts in the sense that they may be more willing not to favour preservation of life.
91 Ibid at [16] and [25].
92 See above, n 65.
93 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 25 (2) (c).
94 See above, n 65 at [63]. The patient, E, included such a clause in the case.
95 Ibid at [68] and [69].
96 Ibid at [68].
97 Ibid at [69].
98 See above, n 82.
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C. Preservation of life
In tandem with a reluctance to apply the section 25 safeguards as evidenced above,
Jackson J in the Court of Protection has shown a willingness to accept that preserva-
tion of life should not always be the guiding principle, even where an advance decision
exists but does not comply with the required formalities.
In Re D, a declaration was sought by an NHS Trust that it would be lawful to with-
draw all life-sustaining treatment, including ANH, from a patient in a permanent vege-
tative state (PVS).99 Originally, a course of surgery was proposed to remove a
malignant tumour from the patient’s thyroid gland. Various complications after that
surgery left the patient in a PVS, but, prior to the initial surgery, the patient gave his
sister-in-law a signed letter in which he set out his wishes to refuse all medical treat-
ment that would simply extend a reduced quality of life.100 The only problem was that
this purported advance decision was deemed invalid under the terms of the Mental
Capacity Act 2005 because it did not meet the additional formalities required to
refuse life-saving treatment.101 Irrespective of this, Jackson J authorised the withdrawal
of treatment on the basis that it was in the patient’s best interests. For him, the
patient’s prior wishes ‘carried very great weight’.102
This case signiﬁes the potential interplay between, on the one hand, sections 24 and
25 of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, and, on the other, section 4 (6). The signed letter
from the patient was insufﬁcient in the sense that it could not be classiﬁed as a legally
valid advance decision, yet where this is the case any decision made for a patient lacking
capacity must be made on the basis of best interests. Thus, as section 4 (6) instructs the
decision maker to take into account, so far as is reasonably ascertainable, the person’s
past and present wishes and feelings (and, in particular, any relevant written statement
made by him when he had capacity),103 Jackson J could give legal effect to the patient’s
prior wishes by placing emphasis on this aspect of the best interests assessment. In
many respects, this represents a more enlightened approach from a judge and, on one
level, Jackson J’s approach ought to be well-received as being more patient-orientated.
The general tendency towards favouring preservation of life was eclipsed here by evi-
dence pertaining to what the patient would have wanted. However, it is too early to
suggest whether or not this case will represent the beginning of a change in attitude
from judges. There are particular characteristics present in this case which mark it out
as being distinct from others in which no advance decision was present and in which
the opposite outcome was reached in terms of the patient’s best interests.
In W v M and Others, the patient was diagnosed as being in a minimally conscious
state.104 Baker J sitting in the Court of Protection was asked, in the ﬁrst case of its
99 [2012] EWHC 885 (COP).
100 Ibid at [15].
101 Ibid at [16].
102 Ibid at [17].
103 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 4 (6) (a). The decision maker must also consider, so far as is reasonably ascer-
tainable, (b) the beliefs and values that would be likely to inﬂuence his decision if he had capacity, and (c)
the other factors that he would be likely to consider if he were able to do so.
104 [2011] EWHC 2443; [2012] 1 WLR 110. For a recent critique see R Heywood, ‘Moving on From Bland:
The Evolution of the Law and Minimally Conscious Patients’ (2014) Med LR doi: 10.1093/medlaw/
fwu003.
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kind, to grant a declaration authorising the withdrawal of life-sustaining ANH from
the patient. There was no advance decision present.105 The decision therefore fell to
be resolved on the basis of best interests. Given the lack of an advance decision, the
case is ostensibly similar to the position in Re D. There was unchallenged evidence
supporting the fact that the patient would not have wished to be kept alive in her
current state.106 This was considered under section 4 (6) in the same manner as it
was in Re D.107 However, Baker J reached the opposite conclusion and, in his judg-
ment, preservation of life was the dominating factor in his best interests assessment.108
What, if anything, marks Re D out as being different and what persuaded Jackson J to
ﬁnd as he did?
In Re D, there were three factors that marked out the evidence in favour of respect-
ing the patient’s wishes as being of a ‘uniformly high quality’.109 First, there was com-
pelling evidence in writing from the patient himself as to what he wanted to happen.
While this was not a valid advance decision, the written evidence from the patient was
articulate, reasoned, and intelligible. Second, at the time he wrote his letter, there was
admittedly no formal assessment of his capacity, but there was nothing speciﬁcally to
doubt it and the content of the letter itself demonstrated a reasoned understanding of
his decision and its consequences. Accordingly, it would have been easier for Jackson
J to accept that the patient had capacity at the time he expressed his wishes, thereby
adding support to the quality of the evidence. Finally, the medical evidence in the
case pointed to the fact that because of the patient’s condition, continuing the treat-
ment was futile and there was no realistic prospect of recovery.110 On a rounded
assessment of best interests, everything pointed to withdrawal being the most desir-
able course of action. However, even if the evidence in relation to the patient’s wishes
was removed from the equation, a narrower assessment of best interests may still have
yielded the same result as the futility of the treatment may have been the most signiﬁ-
cant factor. On this point, while Re D could be interpreted as patient-centred and
autonomy enhancing, it could equally be viewed as a case in which the patient’s
wishes and best interests (objectively deﬁned) coincide. In light of the decision of the
House of Lords in Bland,111 it is not clear that there were in fact many more options
available to the court other than to countenance the withdrawal of the treatment.
The situation was different in W v M. There was no direct evidence from the
patient herself as to what her wishes would have been, either in writing or in some
other format; the evidence only came from the patient’s relatives and partner.112
Thus, the evidence as to the patient’s wishes, from third parties, was not as robust and
reliable. Equally, while the patient’s capacity was never questioned at the time she was
purported to have expressed her views, absent anything in writing from the patient
herself, there was less scope for Baker J to assess the level of understanding and
105 Ibid at [223].
106 Ibid at [225].
107 Ibid at [223].
108 Ibid at [249].
109 See above n 99 at [18].
110 Ibid at [18].
111 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789.
112 See above, n 104 at [242] and [247].
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thought process which underpinned her wishes. Finally, the patient was clinically
stable in W v M and so the question of futility was much more in the balance.113 A
more sophisticated assessment of best interests was therefore required and the ques-
tion was much more delicately poised, with evidence pulling Baker J in opposite direc-
tions. In view of the fact that death was not reasonably imminent for the patient, it
would have been a signiﬁcant break with tradition to base everything on third party
evidence as to what the patient’s wishes may have been. Even so, Baker J’s judgment is
still open to criticism as being particularly narrow and it does raise some interesting
questions about the precise extent to which the bias in favour of life should be allowed
to dictate the outcome.114
V. A CONTINUING BIAS?
Michalowski is correct in stating that ‘the criteria according to which liability can be
avoided when upholding the validity of advance decisions (reasonable belief based on
objective grounds) are much stricter than those for disregarding such a decision (a
physician’s satisfaction that the advance decision was not valid or applicable)’.115 As
such, the spirit of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 still embraces a bias towards preser-
vation of life by encouraging doctors to disregard advance decisions instead of abiding
by them. However, in light of the uncertainty surrounding the validity of advance
decisions in general, whenever healthcare professionals and their legal advisers are
faced with a case in which there is an element of doubt, they are now likely to turn to
the court for an answer.
Insofar as the question of capacity is concerned, there is still a degree of ﬂexibility
in the law in terms of this aspect of advance decision making. If there is any doubt as
to the patient’s capacity at the time she created an advance decision, judges have been
seen to tread cautiously and favour medical intervention. Nevertheless, if a judge is
prepared to accept that the patient had capacity at the time of making the advance
decision, and that the formalities have been complied with, it seems there will need to
be strong evidence pointing the other way in order to trigger the application of the
safeguards.
Capacity, therefore, seems to be the control device that judges rely on most fre-
quently to override an advance decision. This component is arguably where the bias
in favour of life remains most apparent. It is possible to argue here that the law does
not quite reach an optimum balance. Elsewhere, however, a more even balance does
seem to be struck because once the issue of capacity is decided in favour of the
patient, the early indications are that judges will not be disposed to use the safeguards
to override an advance decision unless there is substantial evidence in support of their
application. Thus, it may be more appropriate to reduce the ﬂexibly in respect of the
capacity question, as suggested earlier in this piece, and then to use the safeguards as
113 Ibid at [248].
114 See Heywood, above, n 104; R Huxtable, ‘“In a Twilight Word”? Judging the Value of Life for the Minim-
ally Conscious Patient’ (2013) 39 J Med Ethics 565; A Mullock, ‘Deciding the Fate of a Minimally Con-
scious Patient: An Unsatisfactory Balancing Act?: W v M and Others [2011] EWHC 2443 (Fam)’ (2012)
20 MLR 460; R Heywood, ‘Withdrawal of Treatment from Minimally Conscious Patients’ (2012) 7 Clin
Eth 10–6.
115 Michalowski, above, n 7 at 960.
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the appropriate counterbalancing mechanism. At present, however, the point is rarely
reached in which the safeguards can be used in this manner because the capacity ques-
tion causes the advance decision to fall at the ﬁrst hurdle. As a consequence, in view
of the law as it stands, judges have to be careful not to lean too far in favour of preserv-
ing life by being unduly quick to hold that the patient was incapacitated, as this is
where the bias could continue to exert a decisive inﬂuence.
Beyond that, even if there is an advance decision which does not comply with the
additional safeguards needed to refuse life-saving treatment, where there is some
direct written evidence from the patient coupled with medical evidence supporting
the futility of the treatment being provided, at least one judge has seen ﬁt to place
emphasis on the patient’s past wishes in the best interests assessment in order to
authorise the withdrawal of treatment.116 One salient point, which remains to be
decided, is whether just one or indeed both of these factors will need to be in exist-
ence in order to encourage a judge to adopt an expansive approach to best interests.
InW v M, on a restrictive interpretation, neither was present.117
It would have been intriguing to see, then, what would have been the situation if,
in W v M, the patient had no valid advance decision but had nonetheless written a
letter expressing her wishes with the same level of clarity and understanding that the
patient in Re D demonstrated.118 Would this evidence have been enough to tip the
best interests assessment in favour of withdrawal under section 4 (6) of the Mental
Capacity Act 2005? Or would Baker J have still been persuaded to err on the side of
preservation of life because her treatment, on one view, was not medically futile?
Alternatively, what if Jackson J had been faced with the same written letter as he was
in Re D, but the medical evidence was more open to debate, both in terms of the
therapeutic beneﬁt the treatment was providing and the clinical stability and life
expectancy of the patient? Would this have been enough to inﬂuence Jackson J to
decide in favour of life? It is only as these factual situations come before a judge, if
indeed they ever do, that an accurate contemporaneous assessment can be made of
how prominent the bias in favour of life still is. At present, it appears that the bias still
exists and relics of the common law decision in HE remain,119 but the actual extent of
that bias is perhaps open to question and the early indications appear to suggest that
it may not be as strong as it once was.
VI . CONCLUSIONS
This article has reﬂected upon, and critically analysed, recent developments in the law
of advance decision making after the advent of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The
contemporary case law illustrates a far from coherent approach across a range of
116 Jackson J in Re D, above, n 99.
117 See above, n 104. On a restrictive view, the fact that the treatment was offering some therapeutic beneﬁt to
the patient could be taken to mean that it was not futile. If, however, futility is analysed in terms of the ben-
eﬁts of treatments compared to the burdens, an approach advocated by John Keown, the question
becomes a much ﬁercer subject of debate in W v M. See R Cranford and L Gostin, ‘Futility: A Concept in
Search of a Deﬁnition’ (1992) 20 Med Law Hlth Care 307; J Keown, The Law and Ethics of Medicine
(Oxford University Press 2012) at 12.
118 See above, n 99.
119 See above, n 5.
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different factual situations. Judicial attitudes oscillate and it is difﬁcult to identify any
principled approach. Aspects of advance decision making have continued to cause
judges problems in respect of validity. It seems capacity, for instance, is a question
which will always be treated, quite rightly in some cases, with caution. Equally, the
standard of evidence that is required to invoke the safeguards remains ill-deﬁned. In a
wider sense, it is difﬁcult to predict where the bias in favour of life will be upheld and
where the evidence will be perceived in a way that gives rise to a more sympathetic
approach to accepting the prior wishes of the patient. Some of this continued uncer-
tainty is unavoidable as this area of law is, by nature, case sensitive. However, this is of
little help to medical professionals who may ﬁnd themselves caught between a rock
and a hard place when assessing the legitimacy of any advance decision at the coalface
of a medical emergency. It is hoped that, as further cases arrive, more useful guidance
will emerge from the courts.
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